Differential Bias Attack for Block Cipher Under Randomized Leakage with Key Enumeration
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Publication:4975181
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57339-7_6zbMath1408.94943OpenAlexW2606951713MaRDI QIDQ4975181
Hidema Tanaka, Haruhisa Kosuge
Publication date: 4 August 2017
Published in: Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2017 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57339-7_6
block cipherrank estimationAESside-channel attackkey enumerationformal security analysisleakage modeldifferential bias attack
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