Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality

DOI10.1145/3055399.3055465zbMath1369.91065arXiv1611.06910OpenAlexW2549743857MaRDI QIDQ4977970

Mingfei Zhao, Yang Cai

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.06910

zbMATH Keywords

dualityrevenuesimple and approximately optimal auctionssubaddtive valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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