Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
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Publication:4978196
DOI10.1137/16M1067275zbMath1378.91093OpenAlexW2746065370MaRDI QIDQ4978196
Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Ning Chen, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 18 August 2017
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/16m1067275
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)
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Cites Work
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