Game-Theoretic Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty and a Case Study on a Real Transit System

DOI10.1613/jair.4317zbMath1364.93013OpenAlexW2116327978MaRDI QIDQ4979440

Milind Tambe, Albert Xin Jiang, Francesco M. Delle Fave, Chao Zhang, Zhengyu Yin, Sarit Kraus, John P. Sullivan

Publication date: 23 June 2014

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4317

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Decentralized systems (93A14) Discrete event control/observation systems (93C65) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

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