Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0177-6zbMath1329.91055arXiv1506.07631OpenAlexW756270012MaRDI QIDQ497945

Swaprava Nath, Christopher R. Dance, Onno R. Zoeter, Yadati Narahari

Publication date: 25 September 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.07631

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesNash equilibriumsocial choicecollective actiondynamic mechanism designMarkov decision problemdynamic pivot mechanisminterdependent value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

Cites Work

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• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• A New Complexity Result on Solving the Markov Decision Problem

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