Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency

DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0173-xzbMath1329.91037OpenAlexW2013998334MaRDI QIDQ497946

Bertrand Tchantcho, Mathieu Martin, Sébastien Courtin

Publication date: 25 September 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x

zbMATH Keywords

\(q\)-majoritypositional rules (simple and sequential)Condorcet consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

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