Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

DOI10.1111/itor.12019zbMath1290.91129OpenAlexW2040669597MaRDI QIDQ4979986

Samar Garrab, Michèle Breton

Publication date: 20 June 2014

Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12019

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesreplicator dynamicsinternational environmental agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries

Cites Work

• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Evolutionary game dynamics

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