A stochastic evolutionary game perspective on the stability of strategic alliances against external opportunism

DOI10.1007/s11424-015-2104-xzbMath1422.91100OpenAlexW2023863143MaRDI QIDQ498091

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 25 September 2015

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-015-2104-x

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystochastic differential equationevolutionary game theorystrategic alliance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Cooperative evolutionary game and applications in construction supplier tendency

Cites Work

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• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
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• On stochastic differential equations
• Research joint ventures: A cooperative game for competitors

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