Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions

DOI10.1080/02331934.2012.756878zbMath1307.91015OpenAlexW2061507419MaRDI QIDQ4981880

Fernanda A. Ferreira, M. Álvarez-Mozos, Alberto A. Pinto, José M. Alonso-Meijide

Publication date: 20 March 2015

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/3764

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationpower indexsimple game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Reformulation of some indices using null player free winning coalitions ⋮ On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
• Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
• Axiomatizations of public good indices with a priori unions
• Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations
• Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

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