A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.11.019zbMath1321.91060OpenAlexW1979857529MaRDI QIDQ498757

Hidekazu Anno

Publication date: 29 September 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.019

zbMATH Keywords

corestrategy-proofnesshousing market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets ⋮ Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Matching with single-peaked preferences ⋮ An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Kidney Exchange
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

This page was built for publication: A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets