Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation

DOI10.2298/YJOR170918001LzbMath1461.91025OpenAlexW2792123013MaRDI QIDQ4987782

Yu-Hsien Liao

Publication date: 4 May 2021

Published in: Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2298/yjor170918001l

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gameexcess functiondynamic processmaximal-utilitymulticriteria situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Collusion properties of values
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games

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