Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006zbMath1321.91073OpenAlexW1973347831MaRDI QIDQ498790

Françoise Forges, Kfir Eliaz

Publication date: 29 September 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolyinformation structureverifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Interactive Information Design ⋮ The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions ⋮ Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists

Cites Work

• On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
• Information in conflicts.
• Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure

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