One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.12.010zbMath1321.91069OpenAlexW3124220067MaRDI QIDQ498820

Tomoya Nakamura

Publication date: 29 September 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127100

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionStackelberg competitionfirst and second mover advantagespublic and private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty ⋮ The optimum output quantity for different competitive behaviors under a fuzzy decision environment

Cites Work

• Characterizing social value of information
• Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
• [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Publication:5441272 Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information]

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