Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
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Publication:498871
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009zbMath1321.91034OpenAlexW2094228445MaRDI QIDQ498871
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Publication date: 29 September 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009
Related Items (3)
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