Mechanism design without quasilinearity
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Publication:4991724
DOI10.3982/TE2910zbMath1466.91074OpenAlexW2627082440MaRDI QIDQ4991724
Debasis Mishra, Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publication date: 3 June 2021
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2910
monotonicityindividual rationalityincentive compatibilityrevenue equivalencenon-quasilinear preferences
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (7)
Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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