Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model

DOI10.3982/TE3797zbMath1466.91127OpenAlexW2911104848MaRDI QIDQ4992068

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Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3797

zbMATH Keywords

posted pricecommon valuesrevenue equivalencereserve priceoptimal auctionmaximum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Selling two identical objects ⋮ How to sell in a sequential auction market ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

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