On the optimal design of biased contests

DOI10.3982/TE3672zbMath1466.91073OpenAlexW3107672918WikidataQ125858163 ScholiaQ125858163MaRDI QIDQ4992069

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Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3672

zbMATH Keywords

contest designTullock contestoptimal biases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (11)

Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Conflicts with momentum ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ Optimally biased contests with draws ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ Optimally biased Tullock contests ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry

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