Collusion and delegation under information control

DOI10.3982/TE3556zbMath1466.91169OpenAlexW3125814619MaRDI QIDQ4992073

Andreas Asseyer

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3556

zbMATH Keywords

delegationcollusioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (3)

Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations

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