Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence From the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India
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Publication:4992090
DOI10.3982/ECTA17041zbMath1466.91165OpenAlexW2911338159MaRDI QIDQ4992090
Publication date: 7 June 2021
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17041
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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