Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions

DOI10.3982/ECTA13426zbMath1466.91027OpenAlexW3011040758MaRDI QIDQ4992094

Philip J. Reny, Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13426

zbMATH Keywords

infinite gamesequential equilibriumfinite consistencyconditional epsilon-equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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