Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

DOI10.3982/ECTA15674zbMath1466.91043OpenAlexW2612540096MaRDI QIDQ4992140

Doron Ravid, Elliot Lipnowski

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15674

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissioncheap talkpersuasioninformation designbelief-based approachquasiconcave envelopesecurability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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