Sequential Information Design

DOI10.3982/ECTA17260zbMath1466.91039OpenAlexW3098249043MaRDI QIDQ4992195

Laura Doval, Jeffrey C. Ely

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17260

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriuminformation structureextensive-form gamesinformation designrobust predictionsBayes' correlated equilibriumcoordinated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (8)

Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective ⋮ Information design in multistage games ⋮ Optimal sequential contests ⋮ Regime change games with an active defender

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