Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

DOI10.3982/ECTA15768zbMath1466.91072OpenAlexW2549628635MaRDI QIDQ4992199

Piotr Dworczak

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15768

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designaftermarketstransparencyinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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