Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games

DOI10.1287/opre.2020.1999zbMath1470.91052arXiv1808.10590OpenAlexW3112936986MaRDI QIDQ4994147

Manxi Wu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Saurabh Amin

Publication date: 17 June 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10590

zbMATH Keywords

transportationtechnologygamesgroup decisionsnonatomic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Potential and congestion games (91A14) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Social learning in nonatomic routing games

Cites Work

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