A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2039zbMath1470.91071arXiv1612.04746OpenAlexW3111651183MaRDI QIDQ4994150

Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Michal Feldman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Ophir Friedler, Alon Eden

Publication date: 17 June 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.04746

zbMATH Keywords

approximationcomplementsmechanism designrevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (4)

Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer ⋮ Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation ⋮ On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

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