Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions
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Publication:4994171
DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2007zbMath1478.91089OpenAlexW3127473478MaRDI QIDQ4994171
Yash Kanoria, Hamid Nazerzadeh
Publication date: 17 June 2021
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2007
online advertisingincentive-compatible mechanismrepeated second-price auctionsbidder-specific valuation distributionheterogenous itemsreserve price optimizationstatic Myerson optimal auction
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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