A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
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Publication:4997317
DOI10.1137/16M1100113zbMath1467.91022OpenAlexW2981591722WikidataQ126979528 ScholiaQ126979528MaRDI QIDQ4997317
Nikhil R. Devanur, Yang Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publication date: 29 June 2021
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/16m1100113
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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