The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

DOI10.1287/moor.2020.1070zbMath1468.91063arXiv1707.03551OpenAlexW3117412622MaRDI QIDQ5000644

Alexandros A. Voudouris, Ioannis Caragiannis

Publication date: 15 July 2021

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03551

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationprice of anarchyliquid welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Related Items (2)

Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings

Cites Work

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• Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations
• On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
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• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
• Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
• Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game

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