Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
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Publication:5000656
DOI10.1287/moor.2020.1089zbMath1468.91046OpenAlexW3135661817MaRDI QIDQ5000656
Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 15 July 2021
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/0134c2df-d4fc-40e0-b052-33f2b71be15e
Related Items (6)
Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions ⋮ Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results
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