$\epsilon$-Nash Equilibria for Major–Minor LQG Mean Field Games With Partial Observations of All Agents

DOI10.1109/TAC.2020.3010129zbMath1467.91012arXiv1810.04369OpenAlexW3100387015MaRDI QIDQ5002085

Peter E. Caines, Dena Firoozi

Publication date: 26 July 2021

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.04369

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mean field games and control (49N80) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)

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