Monitoring strategies of enterprise’s emission reduction with asymmetric information

DOI10.1051/ro/2020095zbMath1469.91036OpenAlexW3083406121MaRDI QIDQ5002373

Min Huang, Kegui Chen, Liang Ren, Xin Yu Wang

Publication date: 27 July 2021

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2020095

zbMATH Keywords

delegationoverconfidencesalesforce compensationeffort-dependent demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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