Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.108zbMath1499.91043OpenAlexW2887677860MaRDI QIDQ5002792

Pinyan Lu, Jing Chen, Yingkai Li, Bo Li

Publication date: 28 July 2021

Full work available at URL: https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/icalp/icalp2018.html#0001LLL18

zbMATH Keywords

complexity of Bayesian mechanismsquantile queriesvalue queries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
• Matroid prophet inequalities
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
• Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions

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