Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.155zbMath1499.91019arXiv1804.09468OpenAlexW2798587443MaRDI QIDQ5002845

Thomas Kesselheim, Bojana Kodric

Publication date: 28 July 2021

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09468

zbMATH Keywords

smoothnessrisk aversionmechanism designprice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk

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