Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions

DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2073zbMath1469.90088OpenAlexW3133818088MaRDI QIDQ5003721

Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian, Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni

Publication date: 29 July 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2073

zbMATH Keywords

thresholdingincentivesmechanism designbudget constraintsonline advertisingthrottlingbid shadingrepeated auctionsmultiplicative boostingreserve pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (1)

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets

Cites Work

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• Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment
• Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e
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• Clinching Auctions with Online Supply

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