Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
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Publication:5003721
DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2073zbMath1469.90088OpenAlexW3133818088MaRDI QIDQ5003721
Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian, Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni
Publication date: 29 July 2021
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2073
thresholdingincentivesmechanism designbudget constraintsonline advertisingthrottlingbid shadingrepeated auctionsmultiplicative boostingreserve pricing
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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Cites Work
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