The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009zbMath1321.91095OpenAlexW2099022823MaRDI QIDQ500490

Guoqiang Tian, Zhen-Hua Jiao

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

coremany-to-many matchingmax-min preferencespairwise-stabilitysetwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

Cites Work

• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage