Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.02.010zbMath1321.91108OpenAlexW3123312439MaRDI QIDQ500509

Patrick W. Schmitz, Daniel Müller

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

law enforcementincentiveslimited liabilitypenaltiesrepeat offenders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (1)

The option value of record-based sanctions

Cites Work

• Minimum wages and excessive effort supply
• Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited
• Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
• REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*

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