Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.02.028zbMath1321.91036OpenAlexW2138974300MaRDI QIDQ500518

Michael Peress, Paul J. Healy

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.028

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnervoting rulesNash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality

Cites Work

• A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

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