Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.03.015zbMath1321.91035OpenAlexW2031896404MaRDI QIDQ500589

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

social choicevetoerweak decisivenessweak independent decisiveness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Weak independence and the Pareto principle

Cites Work

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• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
• Twitching weak dictators
• Weak independence and veto power.
• Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
• Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem
• Internal Consistency of Choice

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