Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3zbMath1480.91005OpenAlexW2586491220MaRDI QIDQ5005897

Hannu Nurmi, Dan S. Felsenthal

Publication date: 11 August 2021

Published in: SpringerBriefs in Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3

zbMATH Keywords

Monotonicity, non-show paradox, voting methodes, fixed electorate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections ⋮ Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules ⋮ Weighted committee games

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