Genericity Analysis of Multi-Leader-Disjoint-Followers Game
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Publication:5010049
DOI10.1137/20M1356476zbMath1476.91029OpenAlexW3191198933MaRDI QIDQ5010049
Sébastien Lepaul, Stephan Dempe, Gemayqzel Bouza Allende, Didier Aussel
Publication date: 24 August 2021
Published in: SIAM Journal on Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/20m1356476
Related Items (3)
Existence Results for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems under Continuity-Like Properties of Sublevel Sets ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games
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