Genericity Analysis of Multi-Leader-Disjoint-Followers Game

DOI10.1137/20M1356476zbMath1476.91029OpenAlexW3191198933MaRDI QIDQ5010049

Sébastien Lepaul, Stephan Dempe, Gemayqzel Bouza Allende, Didier Aussel

Publication date: 24 August 2021

Published in: SIAM Journal on Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/20m1356476

zbMATH Keywords

regularitygenericitystationary pointsMPCCmulti-leader-disjoint-followers problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (3)

Existence Results for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems under Continuity-Like Properties of Sublevel Sets ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games

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