Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys

DOI10.3982/ECTA17017zbMath1478.91129OpenAlexW3093036166WikidataQ111857933 ScholiaQ111857933MaRDI QIDQ5012750

Itai Ashlagi, Paulo Somaini, Daniel Waldinger, Michael A. Rees, Nikhil Agarwal

Publication date: 25 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17017

zbMATH Keywords

market designdynamic discrete choiceorgan allocationdynamic mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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