Instability of Centralized Markets

DOI10.3982/ECTA15579zbMath1478.91090OpenAlexW3118433976MaRDI QIDQ5012756

Ahmad Peivandi, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date: 25 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15579

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymechanism designcore of incomplete information game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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