Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5013372
DOI10.1142/S021919892050005XzbMath1479.91239MaRDI QIDQ5013372
Publication date: 30 November 2021
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?
- Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
- Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
- Akaike's Information Criterion in Generalized Estimating Equations
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- A prominence theory of context‐sensitive choice behavior
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits