Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits

DOI10.1142/S021919892050005XzbMath1479.91239MaRDI QIDQ5013372

Philipp E. Otto

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamesmarket sizesocial efficiencyexperimental matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

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Cites Work

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