A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Partial Monotonicity of Noncooperative Games

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500061zbMath1479.91015OpenAlexW3005393235MaRDI QIDQ5013373

Naoki Matsumoto

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500061

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnoncooperative gamepure strategypartially monotone

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Characterization of the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
• Discrete fixed point theorems and their application to Nash equilibrium
• Non-cooperative games
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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