Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliance Networks

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500085zbMath1479.91193OpenAlexW3122734285MaRDI QIDQ5013375

Yuntong Wang

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500085

zbMATH Keywords

networkShapley valuerevenue sharingairline alliance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Collaborative airline revenue sharing game with grey demand data

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
• Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• The museum pass game and its value.
• The theory and practice of revenue management
• Approximate nucleolus-based revenue sharing in airline alliances
• Coalitional manipulation on networks
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
• Sharing a polluted river
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Cores of convex games
• COST SHARING IN NETWORKS: SOME OPEN QUESTIONS
• Revenue Management Games: Horizontal and Vertical Competition
• Sharing the Cost of a Capacity Network
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• On the core of linear production games
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
• Mathematical programming for network revenue management revisited

This page was built for publication: Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliance Networks