Auctions with an Invitation Cost

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500140zbMath1479.91149OpenAlexW3080682217MaRDI QIDQ5013384

Carl Lindberg, Erik Ekström

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500140

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryauctionsrandomized strategiesunknown competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
• Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View

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