Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500164zbMath1479.91166OpenAlexW2902467599MaRDI QIDQ5013395

Shubhro Sarkar, Suchismita Tarafdar

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920500164

zbMATH Keywords

complementssubstitutesstrategic delegationmanagerial incentivesprocess R\&D

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model

Cites Work

• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• Correlated Contracts in Oligopoly

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