Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy

DOI10.1142/S021919892050019XzbMath1479.91217OpenAlexW3082696661MaRDI QIDQ5013399

Oliviero A. Carboni, Paolo Russu

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892050019x

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlbasin of attractionevolutionary dynamicscorruption model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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