Multi-Unionism at the Firm Level: The Impact of Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions on Labor Unions’ Merger Incentives

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500031zbMath1479.91147OpenAlexW3117833536MaRDI QIDQ5013406

Dario Cords

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500031

zbMATH Keywords

labor unionsasymmetric Nash bargaining solutionsmerger incentivestariff competitiontariff plurality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Efficiency wages and local versus central wage bargaining
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

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