Trait-Augmented Games with Limited-Skill Agents

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500043zbMath1479.91006OpenAlexW3119176814WikidataQ115029563 ScholiaQ115029563MaRDI QIDQ5013408

Michael Gmeiner, Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500043

zbMATH Keywords

informationbounded rationalityproduct differentiationskillconstant-sum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Learning with bounded memory in games
• Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction
• Foundations for optimal inattention
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions
• Menu-Dependent Stochastic Feasibility
• Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets
• Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium
• A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *

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